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UNINTENDED PREGNANCY AND PUBLIC POLICY
ADAM THOMAS*
I. INTRODUCTION
Basic demographic facts rarely astonish. Here, however, is
an exception that proves the rule: about half of all pregnancies
in the United States are unintended.' The situation is even
starker for some demographic subgroups. For instance, more
than two-thirds of pregnancies among African-American women
are unintended, as are more than 60% of pregnancies among
women whose incomes place them below the federal poverty
line.' A pregnancy's intendedness (or lack thereof) has wide-
reaching implications. For instance, rates of single parenthood,
physical abuse, and mental health problems are all higher
among women who experience unintended pregnancies than
among women who experience intended pregnancies. Similarly,
physical and mental health problems and delinquent behavior
during the teenage years are more common among children
whose births were unintended than among children whose births
were not. Women who experience unintended pregnancies are
also relatively more likely to delay the initiation of prenatal care
and are relatively less likely to breastfeed their children.' It is, of
course, difficult to parse out the extent to which these dynamics
are causal rather than merely correlational. Some studies have
used sophisticated analytical techniques to determine whether
there is a causal relationship between unintended pregnancy and
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1. Lawrence B. Finer & Mia R. Zolna, Unintended Pregnancy in the United
States: Incidence and Disparities, 2006, 84 CONTRACEPTION 478, 480 (2011).
2. Id. at 481.
3. Information on the marriage rates of women who experience intended
and unintended pregnancies is taken from unpublished tabulations of data
gathered by the Guttmacher Institute. For a survey of the literature on the
association between pregnancy intentions and the other maternal and child
outcomes described here, see CASSANDRA LOGAN ET AL., THE CONSEQUENCES OF
UNINTENDED CHILDBEARING: A WHITE PAPER 3 (2007), available at http://www.
thenationalcampaign.org/resources/pdf/consequences.pdf. Cf Theodore J.
Joyce et al., The Effect of Pregnancy Intention on Child Development, 37 DEMOGRAPHY
83, 88-93 (2000).
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maternal and child outcomes, and these studies' findings tend to
show that the former affects the latter negatively.'
Unintended pregnancy has important implications not only
for the women and children who are directly affected, but also
for society at large. Well-designed studies have shown that reduc-
tions in unintended childbearing depress crime rates and welfare
receipt.' In another recent study, Emily Monea and I find that
4. For example, some studies have exploited plausibly exogenous varia-
tion over time in state laws governing access to oral contraception to estimate
the effect of access to birth control on various maternal outcomes. Because
access to contraception lowers the risk of experiencing an unintended preg-
nancy, the results of these studies can reasonably be interpreted as reflecting in
part the effect of reductions in unintended pregnancy on the authors' out-
comes of interest. These studies' findings suggest that expansions in access to
the pill have raised women's educational attainment and increased their rates
of labor force participation. See Martha J. Bailey, More Power to the Pill: The
Impact of Contraceptive Freedom on Women's Life Cycle Labor Supply, 121 Q.J. EcON.
289, 289-94 (2006); Claudia Goldin & Lawrence F. Katz, The Power of the Pill:
Oral Contraceptives and Women's Career and Marriage Decisions, 110 J. Po... EcoN.
730, 730-31 (2002); Elizabeth Oltmans Ananat & Daniel M. Hungerman, The
Power of the Pill for the Marginal Child: Oral Contraception's Effects on Fertility, Abor-
tion, and Maternal & Child Characteristics 1-3 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper, March 2008), available at http://nd.edu/-dhungerm/Power
ofPill.pdf. See also Amalia R. Miller, Motherhood Delay and the Human Capital of
the Next Generation, 99 AM. EcON. Ri~v. 154, 156-57 (2009), in which the author
instruments for mothers' age at first birth using information on biological fertil-
ity shocks such as the occurrence of miscarriages. She finds that delayed
childbearing leads to higher standardized test scores for firstborn children. In
addition, some scholars have exploited variation in state abortion laws over time
in an attempt to identify the effect of access to legal abortion on the characteris-
tics of a given birth cohort. Because increased access to abortion reduces the
number of unintended births, these studies' results can reasonably be inter-
preted as reflecting in part the effect of reductions in unintended childbearing
on the authors' outcomes of interest. See, for example, Elizabeth Oltmans
Ananat et al., Abortion and Selection, 91 REV. EcON. & STAT. 124, 124 (2009), in
which the authors find that previous expansions in access to legal abortion
increased the probability of eventual college graduation among the children in
the affected birth cohort; and see Jonathan Gruber et al., Abortion Legalization
and Child Living Circumstances: Who is the 'Marginal Child'?, 114 Q.J. EcON. 263,
265 (1999), in which the authors find that such expansions reduced the likeli-
hood that members of the affected birth cohort would live in poverty or die
during infancy.
5. SeeJohn J. Donohue III & Steven D. Levitt, The Impact of Legalized Abor-
tion on Crime, 116 QJ. EcoN. 379, 386 (2001). The authors attempt to identify
the effect of access to legal abortion on the crime rate among members of a
given birth cohort by exploiting variation in state abortion laws over time. They
find that expansions in the availability of abortion caused the members of the
affected birth cohort(s) to commit less crime on a per capita basis. Ananat et
al., supra note 4, at 125, and Gruber et al., supra note 4, at 281, also find that
increases in abortion access caused the members of the affected birth cohort to
be less likely to claim welfare assistance.
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taxpayers spend about $11 billion each year on publicly subsi-
dized medical care for women who experience unintended
pregnancies and for infants whose conception was unintended.'
We conclude that, if all unintended pregnancies could be pre-
vented, the resulting taxpayer savings on Medicaid-subsidized
medical care alone would approach the amount that the federal
government spends on the Head Start program each year.7
Perhaps because it is both so common and so consequential,
unintended pregnancy has slowly seeped into our political dis-
course and our policy debates. Although there remains consider-
able disagreement as to how we should go about reducing
unintended pregnancy, there is broad agreement about the
importance of the underlying goal. President Obama seized on
this consensus in his speech at the 2008 Democratic National
Convention when he said that "[w]e may not agree on abortion,
but surely we can agree on reducing the number of unwanted
pregnancies."' This Essay addresses the question of how public
policy can contribute to the achievement of this broadly held
objective. I begin by laying out a set of basic facts about trends in
unintended pregnancy and related outcomes over time, after
which I review research findings on some of the most important
root causes of these phenomena. I then discuss the policy and
legal frameworks that have been developed to address these root
causes, and I describe new evidence showing that certain well-
designed, evidence-based policies are likely to effect meaningful
reductions in unintended pregnancy in a cost-effective way. I
conclude by assessing the recent performance of policymakers in
this arena and offering some thoughts about the way forward.
II. UNINTENDED PREGNANCY: MEASUREMENT AND TRENDS
In order to proceed with a more detailed discussion of the
prevalence of unintended pregnancy, we must first define the
phenomenon of interest as precisely as possible. The primary
source of data on pregnancy intentions is the National Survey of
6. See Emily Monea & Adam Thomas, Unintended Pregnancy and Taxpayer
Spending, 43 PERSP. ON SEXUAL & REPROD. HEALTH 88, 88-93 (2011). See Adam
Sonfield et al., The Public Costs of Births Resulting from Unintended Pregnancies:
National and State-Level Estimates, 43 PERSP. ON SEXUAL & REPROD. HEALTH 94, 94
(2011), for a similar analysis that arrives at much the same conclusion.
7. Monea & Thomas, supra note 6, at 92.
8. Barack Obama, Democratic Nominee for President, Nomination
Acceptance Speech at 2008 Democratic Convention Speech, in Cameron
Brown et al., Barack Obama's Speech at the Democratic National Convention, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 28, 2009), http://elections.nytimes.com/2008/president/
conventions/videos/20080828_OBAMASPEECH.html.
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Family Growth ("NSFG"), a cross-sectional survey that was first
fielded in 1973 and has been administered to new samples every
few years thereafter.' The incidence of unintended pregnancy is
measured using responses to questions in the NSFG that attempt
to assess a woman's pregnancy intentions before she became
pregnant. The NSFG does not actually contain questions that
make explicit reference to unintended pregnancy. Rather,
women who report having experienced a pregnancy in the rela-
tively recent past are asked questions designed to determine the
following: (a) before the respondent became pregnant, did she
wish to have a (or another) child at some point in the future?;
and (b) if the answer to the first question is "yes," would the
respondent have preferred that the focal pregnancy occur later
than it actually occurred? If the answer to the first question is
"no," then the respondent's pregnancy is classified as having
been "unwanted;" if the answer to the second question is "yes,"
then the pregnancy is classified as having been "mistimed." The
number of unintended pregnancies is then taken to be the sum
of the number of mistimed and unwanted pregnancies.' 0
The fact that unintended pregnancy is measured using ret-
rospective survey data is inherently problematic. It is likely that
some share of genuinely unintended pregnancies resulting in
live births are later reported to have been intended, since
mothers may feel reluctant to imply that their children's concep-
tion was a mistake." The challenges of measuring unintended
pregnancy accurately are illustrated by a number of apparent
contradictions in NSFG survey data. For example, only 68% of
women who report having experienced a pregnancy resulting
from contraceptive failure also said that the pregnancy in ques-
tion was unintended.12 Additionally, about half of pregnancies
that are reported to have been unintended occurred to women
9. JAMES M. LEPOWSKI ET AL., NATIONAL CENTER FOR HEALTH STATISTICS,
THE 2006-2010 NATIONAL SURVEY OF FAMILY GROwrH: SAMPLE DESIGN AND ANAL-
YSIS OF A CONTINUOUS SURVEy 2 (2010), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/
data/series/sr_02/sr02_150.pdf.
10. See John Santelli et al., The Measurement and Meaning of Unintended
Pregnancy, 35 PERSP. ON SEXUAL & REPROD. HEALTH 94, 94 (2003). The authors
also note that there is a subtle distinction between unintended pregnancies and
unplanned pregnancies. The latter are defined as pregnancies that occur either
when a woman used contraception or when she did not use contraception but
did not desire to become pregnant. Id. There is a great deal of overlap
between the group of pregnancies that are classified as unplanned and the
group of pregnancies that are classified as unintended. For ease of exposition,
I focus solely on the latter.
11. Id. at 96.
12. Id. at 95.
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who also reported that they were not using contraception at the
time that they became pregnant.13 Some of these inconsistencies
may reflect inaccurate retrospective reporting of one's intentions
at the time that these pregnancies occurred. But it is also likely
that some survey respondents simply feel ambivalent about their
pregnancies. Thus, straightforward survey questions may not be
adequate to measure the complex emotional and psychological
dynamics underlying attitudes related to sex and pregnancy.'
On the whole, then, there is reason to maintain a measure
of skepticism about the way in which information on unintended
pregnancy is gathered. I would argue, however, that these data
are valuable nonetheless. Survey measures clearly capture a large
portion of the variation in genuine pregnancy intentions-
researchers have found that women who report that they want to
have more children are in fact much more likely than women
who do not to experience a subsequent pregnancy' 5-and, per-
haps just as importantly, these data are the best available tool for
the measurement of unintended pregnancy. Thus, I occasionally
draw in the discussion below on survey data related to the inci-
dence of unintended pregnancy. Wherever possible, however, I
rely instead on more concrete correlates of intendedness. For
example, I noted earlier that there is a correlation between sin-
gle parenthood and unintended childbearing, and data
presented below also show that almost all teen pregnancies are
unintended. In addition, more than 90% of abortions involve
pregnancies that are unintended, rather than intended." As
such, I will sometimes focus on rates of out-of-wedlock childbear-
ing, teen pregnancy, and abortion, given the considerable over-
lap that exists between these outcomes and unintended
pregnancy. In addition, I cite evidence in a subsequent section
on the number of pregnancies that would be prevented by vari-
ous public policies. Implicit in my discussion of this evidence is
an assumption that, if a certain number of pregnancies are pre-
vented by a policy that (say) discourages unprotected inter-
course, it must be the case that those pregnancies would have
been unintended, had they occurred.
The survey data on unintended pregnancy-flawed though
they may be-reveal striking subgroup differences. Figures 1-3"
show trends in survey-based measures of unintended pregnancy,
13. Id.
14. Id. at 95-97.
15. Id. at 96.
16. Based on unpublished tabulations of data gathered by the
Guttmacher Institute (on file with author). See supra note 3.
17. See Figures 1-3, infra Appendix A.
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unintended childbearing, and abortion, delineated by age. The
most recent year for which all necessary data are available is
2006, and consistent series for these outcomes can be produced
using information from the 1994, 2001, and 2006 cross sections
of the NSFG." Figure 1 shows trends among all women of
18. In fact, while the NSFG provides the best available information on
pregnancy intentions, the highest-quality data on birth rates are produced by
the National Vital Statistics System ("NVSS"), and the highest-quality data on
abortion rates are produced by the Guttmacher Institute. Because NVSS data
are publicly available and Guttmacher data are not, the Guttmacher Institute
has become the primary source of information on the incidence of unintended
pregnancy. Guttmacher reports combine NSFG estimates of the share of
pregnancies that are unintended with NVSS birth counts and their own esti-
mates of the incidence of abortion and fetal loss in order to produce estimates
of the rate of unintended pregnancy. Guttmacher does not report estimates for
each of these outcomes in every year. The years encompassed in Figures 1-3
are the most recent years for which data are available on all relevant outcomes.
Guttmacher publications tend to report estimates for multiple years in order to
show trends over time. For example, Finer and Zolna report estimated rates of
unintended pregnancy, unintended childbearing, and abortion for 2006 and
2001. See Finer & Zolna, supra note 1, at 481, 483. Finer and Henshaw report
estimates for 2001 and 1994 in their study. See Lawrence B. Finer & Stanley K.
Henshaw, Disparities in Rates of Unintended Pregnancy in the United States, 1994 and
2001, 38 PERSP. ON SEXUAL & REPROD. HEALTH 90, 93 (2006). Finally, Henshaw
reports estimates for 1994, 1987, and 1981. See Stanley K. Henshaw, Unintended
Pregnancy in the United States, 30 FAM. PLAN. Piesie. 24, 27 (1998). There are
modest differences between reports in terms of their estimates of particular out-
comes for the same year. For instance, Finer and Zolna report that the unin-
tended pregnancy rate for 2001 was 50 per 1,000 women, supra note 1, at 481,
but Finer and Henshaw's estimate for the same outcome in the same year was
51 per 1,000 women. See Finer & Henshaw, supra note 18, at 93. Guttmacher
staff informed me that differences of this sort are a function of small changes
that they have instituted over time in the measurement of these outcomes, and
they have told me that my choice of year for the purposes of this analysis is
reasonably trivial. As such, I chose to use the most recently available data for all
estimates. Guttmacher publications generally report outcomes separately for
women in their early and late twenties, and they report both counts and rates
for many outcomes. I used these data and other information contained in the
reports referenced in this footnote to combine tallies of the number of
pregnancies, births, and abortions for women in these two age categories in
order to create a single set of estimates for all women in their twenties. The
estimates reported in Figures 1-3 were constructed using information taken
from the multiple sources. Age-specific data on rates of unintended pregnancy
and unintended childbearing, on the percent of pregnancies that are unin-
tended, and on the percent of pregnancies resulting in abortion for 2001 and
2006 were taken from Finer & Zolna, supra note 1, at 481, 483; age-specific data
on rates of unintended pregnancy and unintended childbearing, on the per-
cent of pregnancies that are unintended, and on the percent of pregnancies
resulting in abortion for 1994 were taken from Finer & Henshaw, supra note 18,
at 93; age-specific data on the number of unintended pregnancies in 2006 were
taken from Finer & Zolna, supra note 1, at 481; age-specific data on the number
of unintended pregnancies in 2001 were taken from Finer & Henshaw, supra
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childbearing age. This figure gives the impression that not much
has happened over the past several years. Both the unintended
pregnancy rate (i.e., the annual number of unintended
pregnancies per 1,000 women) and the percent of pregnancies
that are unintended remained fairly stable over the period of
time covered by the graph. There was a modest decline in the
abortion rate over this period, but that decrease was offset by a
modest increase in the unintended birth rate. The net effect of
these two trends was relative stability in the overall number of
unintended pregnancies.
These aggregate trends conceal a more interesting story at
the subgroup level. Figure 2 shows trends in rates of unintended
pregnancy, unintended childbearing, and abortion among teens;
and Figure 3 shows trends in similar outcomes among young
adults between the ages of twenty and twenty-nine. Because the
overall rate of pregnancy is often an outcome of independent
interest for teens, Figure 2 also shows trends in the overall teen
pregnancy rate. I do not report abortion rate estimates for
women in their twenties because the available data do not allow
me to produce a consistent series for this group over the period
covered by the graph. For these women, I present instead a set
of estimates for a related outcome: the share of unintended
pregnancies that result in abortion. I do not report trends for
women over the age of thirty, in part to conserve space and in
part because most pregnancies-nearly two-thirds-are to
women who fall below this age threshold. Trends in unintended
pregnancy, unintended childbearing, and abortion among older
women are reasonably similar to the trends shown here for
women in their twenties.'
note 18, at 93; age-specific data on the number of unintended pregnancies in
1994 were taken from Henshaw, supra note 18, at 26; data on abortion rates for
women aged 15-44 for all three years were taken from Rachel K. Jones &
Kathryn Kooistra, Abortion Incidence and Access to Services in the United States, 2008,
43 PERSP. ON SEXUAL & REPROD. HEALTH 41, 43 (2011); data on teen abortion
rates for all three years were taken from Kathryn Kost et al., US. Teenage
Pregnancies, Births, and Abortions: National and State Trends by Race and Ethnicity 6
(Guttmacher Institute, Working Paper, January 2010), available at http://www.
guttmacher.org/pubs/USTPtrends.pdf; data on teen pregnancy rates (without
regard to pregnancy intention) in 2006 and 2001 were taken from Finer &
Zolna, supra note 1, at 481; and data on teen pregnancy rates in 1994 (again,
without regard to pregnancy intention) were taken from Finer & Henshaw,
supra note 18, at 93.
19. However, the levels of the quantities estimated for Figures 1-3, infra,
Appendix A, are quite a bit lower among women in their thirties. For example,
the data that I used to construct the series shown in Figures 1-3 indicate that
the unintended birth rate among women in their twenties increased by about
15% between 1994 and 2001 and then by another 15% or so between 2001 and
20121 507
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Focusing first on Figure 2, a comparison of the rates of over-
all pregnancy and unintended pregnancy among teens in any
given year indicates that (not surprisingly) the substantial major-
ity of teen pregnancies are unintended. The most important
insight from this graph, however, is that there has clearly been a
reduction since the mid-1990s in overall pregnancy rates-and
therefore in unintended pregnancy rates-among teens. Rates
of unintended childbearing and abortion have also been in
decline among teenage girls. These declines have been sizeable.
Over the twelve years covered by the graph, rates of teen preg-
nancy and unintended pregnancy among teens dropped by
around 30%. These reductions were attributable to a reasonably
large (about 15%) reduction in unintended childbearing and an
even more substantial (more than 40%) reduction in the num-
ber of abortions. Figure 3 shows that the story is quite different
for older women: rates of unintended childbearing have increased
among women in their twenties, although this increase has been
offset somewhat by a decline in abortion. The net result of these
two trends has been a modest increase in rates of unintended
pregnancy among women in this age group.
To summarize, then, the "lack of news" suggested by the rel-
ative stability in the aggregate rate of unintended pregnancy
belies two important facts. First, the incidence of abortion has
declined in recent years for both teens and young adults.20 And
2006. Comparable estimates taken from the same data sources indicate that
unintended childbearing increased by about a third between 1994 and 2001
and by about 10% between 2001 and 2006 among women in their early thirties.
For both groups, then, there has been a notable increase in rates of unintended
childbearing between 1994 and 2006. However, the levels of those rates differ
between the two groups. For instance, in 2006, the unintended birth rate per
1,000 women was (as is shown in Figure 3) about 45 for women in their twen-
ties. The comparable rate in the same year was only about 22 per 1,000 women
in their early thirties. The fact that older women have lower unintended preg-
nancy and unintended birth rates than women in their teens and twenties
explains why the overall rates shown in Figure 1-which presents estimates for
all women under the age of 45-are lower than the rates for teenaged girls or
for young adults as reported in Figures 2 and 3.
20. In fact, Figure 3, infra, Appendix A, does not report the incidence of
abortion for women in their twenties. Due to data limitations, the figure
reports instead the percent of unintended pregnancies that result in an abor-
tion. By taking the product of this quantity and the unintended pregnancy rate
in a given year, I can calculate the number of unintended pregnancies that
result in abortion per 1,000 women aged 20-29. (Unfortunately, I cannot use
this approach to calculate an overall abortion rate, since: (1) a small number of
abortions are the result of intended pregnancies, and (2) there are no publicly
available data on the share of intended pregnancies that result in abortion.)
According to my calculations, the "unintended abortion rate" among women in
their twenties dropped from 46.8% in 1994 to 38.3% in 2006, which represents
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second, the indicators shown in Figures 1-3 suggest that consid-
erable progress has been made in lowering rates of unintended
childbearing among teens but not among their older counter-
parts. It is also worth noting that the most recent data show that,
after declining for a decade and a half, the teen birth rate
increased slightly in 2006 and 2007, then decreased in 2008 and
2009, and now sits at the lowest level ever recorded."' Although
it is difficult to determine what these data points portend for the
future, we can conclude that the recent trend among teens has
been a bumpy but generally promising one. The most pressing
question is this: what can be done to reinforce the progress that
has been made among teens and to reverse the more discourag-
ing trends among women in their twenties? The next section
begins to answer this question by exploring the underlying
causes of unintended pregnancy and childbearing.
III. WHAT ARE THE CAUSES OF UNINTENDED PREGNANCY?
In a recent article, my co-authors and I argue that unin-
tended pregnancies occur for three reasons: a lack of motivation
to avoid unprotected sex; insufficient knowledge about how best
to avoid unintended pregnancy; and limited access to effective
contraception." There is evidence to suggest that each of these
three explanations is important. With respect to the first expla-
nation, a number of societal factors and personal circumstances
can affect an individual's motivation to avoid risky sexual behav-
ior. For instance, sociologists have produced a rich body of
research showing that many young women in low-income neigh-
borhoods believe that their economic prospects are quite limited
and therefore assume that they will face few detrimental long-run
consequences if they have children either as teenagers or out of
wedlock. In their landmark work on this topic, Edin and Kefalas
quote a single mother in her mid-twenties who says, "I could sit
here and say, 'Oh, I would have . . . gone to a four year college'
[if I hadn't gotten pregnant, but] I probably wouldn't have."23
Based on their extensive ethnographic research, the authors con-
a reduction of about 18% in the number of abortions resulting from unin-
tended pregnancies.
21. BRADY E. HAMILTON ET AL., NAT'L VITAL STATISTICS SYSTEM, BIRTHS:
PRELIMINARY DATA FOR 2010 1 (2011), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/
data/nvsr/ nvsr6O/nvsr60_02.pdf.
22. Isabel Sawhill, Adam Thomas & Emily Monea, An Ounce of Prevention:
Policy Prescriptions for Reducing the Prevalence of Fragile Families, 20 FUTURE CHILI).
133, 133 (2010).
23. KATHRYN EDIN & MARIA KEFALAs, PROMISES I CAN KEEP: WHY POOR
WOMEN PuT MOTHERHOOD BEFORE MARRIAGE 171 (2005).
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clude that the limited perceived costs of single motherhood
among low-income women leads to a deep-seated ambivalence
about whether or not they truly want to avoid becoming preg-
nant. In assessing the attitudes of single mothers in their study,
the authors write that "typically, young women describe their
pregnancies as 'not exactly planned' yet 'not exactly avoided'
either-as only a few were using any form of contraception at all
when their 'unplanned' child was conceived.""
The thrust of Edin and Kefalas's conclusions is reinforced by
the results of Kearney and Levine's 2011 study. The authors
assume that the level of income inequality is an important deter-
minant of low-income individuals' perceptions of their economic
prospects, and they find that disadvantaged teen females are rela-
tively more likely to experience non-marital births if they live in
locations characterized by relatively higher levels of income ine-
quality.2 5 It is important to bear in mind, however, that ambiva-
lence toward unintended pregnancy and out-of-wedlock
childbearing is not limited to disadvantaged groups. A nationally
representative survey of unmarried young men and women con-
ducted by the National Campaign to Prevent Teen and Unplan-
ned Pregnancy shows that 38% of males and 44% of females
agree with the statement that "[i]t doesn't matter whether you
use birth control or not; when it is your time to get pregnant it
will happen."2 ' These attitudes are consistent with broad cul-
tural trends: over time, respondents to national surveys have
become increasingly unlikely to express disapproval of cohabita-
tion or premarital sex or to agree with contentions that unmar-
ried childbearing is immoral or destructive to society.17 On the
whole, then, cultural and economic circumstances have con-
spired to create a sense of ambivalence and fatalism among many
young adults that ultimately diminishes their motivation to curb
the kinds of behaviors that cause unintended pregnancies to
occur.
24. Id. at 37.
25. See Melissa Schettini Kearney & Phillip B. Levine, Income Inequality and
Early Non-Marital Childbearing: An Economic Exploration of the "Culture of Despair,"
4, 29 (Nat'1 Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 17157, 2011),
http://www.nber.org/papers/w17l57.pdf.
26. KELLEEN KAYE ET AL., NAT'L CAMPAIGN TO PREVENT TEEN AND UNPIAN-
NED PREGNANCY, THE FOG ZONE: How MISPERCEPTIONS, MAGICAL THINKING, AND
AMBIVALENCE PUT YOUNG ADULTS AT RISK FOR UNPLANNED PREGNANCY 6 (2009).
27. See PEW RESEARCH CENTER, GENERATION GAP IN VALUES, BEHAVIORS: As
MARRIAGE AND PARENTHOOD DRr APART, PUBLIC IS CONCERNED ABOUT SOCIAL
IMPACT 40 (2007); Arland Thornton & Linda Young-DeMarco, Four Decades of
Trends in Attitudes Toward Family Issues in the United States: The 19 60s Through the
199 0s, 63 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 1009, 1023, 1025 (2001).
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There is also a wealth of evidence demonstrating the impor-
tance of the second factor referenced above: insufficient knowl-
edge about how best to avoid an unintended pregnancy. For
example, among the unmarried young adults responding to the
National Campaign survey described above, almost a third
reported knowing little or nothing about condoms; nearly two-
thirds reported knowing little or nothing about birth control
pills; and more than half reported that they have never heard of
the birth control implant." Almost 60% of young unmarried
women participating in the study also said it was likely that they
were infertile despite the fact that less than 10% of women in
their age group actually experience fertility problems. 29 In addi-
tion, most female respondents reported beliefs that were at odds
with clinical evidence about the health risks (or lack thereof)
associated with various forms of hormonal contraception."o And
perhaps most disturbingly, 90% of respondents claimed that they
have all the knowledge needed to avoid an unintended
pregnancy.3 1
Regarding the third factor referenced above-insufficient
access to effective contraception-the evidence is somewhat
mixed. It is clearly the case that, for many individuals, some of
the most effective contraceptive methods would be prohibitively
expensive without insurance coverage.3 2 For example, the total
cost of a contraceptive implant approaches $1,000.'" Although
the implant lasts for about three years on average, the bulk of
these expenses are incurred up front. In addition, oral contra-
ception, contraceptive patches, and contraceptive rings can each
cost more than $500 per year if they are not covered by health
insurance." Condoms, on the other hand, are reasonably inex-
pensive-they cost about $1.00 each-and although they are
much more susceptible to user error and are therefore less effec-
tive than the other methods mentioned here, they nonetheless
reduce the risk of pregnancy dramatically if used properly."
28. KAYE ET AL., supra note 26, at 8.
29. Id. at 9.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 10.
32. All cost estimates cited in this paragraph are based on the author's
analysis of data taken from James Trussell et al., Cost Effectiveness of Contraceptives
in the United States, 79 CONTRACEITION 5, 10 (2009). These cost figures account
for expenses associated with the contraception itself and with related medical
services.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
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Speaking broadly, then, there is somewhat of a positive correla-
tion between a method's effectiveness and its cost.
Although it seems plausible that the comparatively higher
cost of the most effective methods might create a barrier to their
use, survey respondents tend not to cite cost concerns when
explaining why they do not use more effective contraceptive
methods." At the same time, evidence cited later in this Essay
suggests that, when the cost of contraception is publicly subsi-
dized, the frequency of contraceptive use increases and rates of
unintended pregnancy and childbearing are reduced as a
result." These findings provide the most convincing evidence
that the cost of effective contraception places upward pressure
on the rate of unintended pregnancy.
IV. WHAT CAN BE DONE TO REDUCE THE RATE
oF UNINTENDED PREGNANCY?
There are already public policies in place that attack each of
the causes of unintended pregnancy laid out in the previous sec-
tion. There are, for instance, several policies that have the
potential to affect the first of these three root causes: a lack of
motivation to avoid unintended pregnancy. As an example, sev-
eral local media campaigns encouraging safer sexual behavior
have been implemented in recent years. Most of these cam-
paigns tout the benefits of condom use as a way of reducing the
spread of sexually transmitted infections, and some of them have
been evaluated by researchers who compare changes in condom
use in cities where campaigns were implemented to changes in
similar cities where campaigns were not implemented." Differ-
ences between the trends in condom use in comparable "treat-
ment" and "control" municipalities are assumed to reflect the
effects of these media campaigns. In a widely cited paper, Leslie
Snyder and her coauthors combine the results of these evalua-
tions and conclude that, as a group, they changed the behavior
of about 6% of the members of their target populations.
36. SeeJENNIFER J. FROST ET AL., GUTTMACHER INST., IN BRIEF: IMPROVING
CONTRACEPTIVE USE IN THE UNITED STATES 3-4 (2008); NAT'L CAMPAIGN TO PRE-
vENT TEEN AND UNPLANNED PREGNANCY, MAGICAL THINKING: YOUNG ADULTS
ATTITUDES AND BELIEFS ABOUT SEX, CONTRACEPTION, AND UNPLANNED PREG-
NANCY 7 (2008).
37. See infra notes 57-60 and accompanying text.
38. See Adam Thomas, Three Strategies to Prevent Unintended Pregnancy, 32 J.
POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 1, 8 (2012).
39. Leslie B. Snyder et al., A Meta-Analysis of the Effect of Mediated Health
Communication Campaigns on Behavior Change in the United States, 9 J. HEALTH
COMM. 71, 86 (2004).
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Although this might sound like a "small" effect, evidence
presented below shows that an impact of this magnitude is suffi-
cient to produce returns to taxpayers that exceed the costs of
these campaigns.
Another policy with the potential to affect motivation is
child support enforcement, since stricter enforcement provides
an incentive to avoid non-marital childbearing by raising its cost.
The federal government and many state governments have
enacted laws over the years that improve their ability to locate
absent fathers, obtain child support orders, and secure payments
from them. One well-designed study analyzes changes in child
support enforcement and out-of-wedlock childbearing within
states over time.40 The study concludes that increases in child
support enforcement during the 1980s and 1990s resulted in a
reduction of about 12% in out-of-wedlock births.4
Child support enforcement measures and policies that pro-
mote economic mobility might be thought of as opposite sides of
the same coin: whereas the former discourage unprotected sex
by raising the cost of out-of-wedlock childbearing, the latter cre-
ate the same incentives by raising the payoff to playing by the
rules. In other words, low-income individuals like the ones
included in Edin and Kefalas's study may change their behavior
if they can be convinced that the avoidance of non-marital
childbearing will genuinely brighten their economic prospects.
A handful of analyses have tested this hypothesis in various ways.
40. Irwin Garfinkel et al., The Roles of Child Support Enforcement and Welfare
in Non-Marital Childhearing, 16J. POPULATION ECON. 55, 61-66 (2003).
41. Id. at 67-68. A variety of changes have also been made to welfare
programs that, like increases in child support enforcement, should improve
incentives to avoid unprotected sex by raising the cost of single parenthood.
These changes include a reduction in the real (inflation-adjusted) value of cash
assistance benefits, a requirement that mothers under the age of eighteen live
with a parent or guardian and enroll in school as a condition of receiving cash
assistance, and a requirement that adult recipients work or look for employ-
ment. See Sawhill, Thomas & Monea, supra note 22, at 141-42. One well-
designed synthesis of the best available evidence found that these policy
changes had little if any effect on teen birth rates. See LISA A. GENNETIAN ET AL.,
How WELFARE AND WORK POLICIES FOR PARENTS AFFECT ADOLESCENTS: A SYNTHE-
SIS OF RESFARCH 21 (2002); cf Leonard M. Lopoo & Thomas DeLeire, Did Wel-
fare Reform Influence the Fertility of Young Teens?, 25 J. Po.'y ANALYSIS & MGMT.
275, 291 (2006). Garfinkel et al., supra, note 40, at 67-68, find suggestive evi-
dence that these policies may have had a modest effect on non-marital
childbearing, but they also find that child support enforcement had a larger
and more robust effect. My assessment of this literature is that the evidence
regarding the effect of changes in welfare policy on out-of-wedlock childbearing
is mixed at best, while the evidence on the effect of child support enforcement
is more convincing.
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For example, one study finds that teens who live in states with
relatively lower college tuition costs are relatively less likely to
engage in risky sexual behavior during their high school years.4 2
A related study posits that teenage girls determine the "income
penalty" associated with teenage childbearing by comparing the
economic well-being of demographically similar women who are
somewhat older than they and who had children as teenagers
with the well-being of demographically similar women who are of
the same age who did not have teen births.43 The authors find
that larger perceived income losses associated with teen
childbearing were correlated with lower birth rates among the
girls in their sample.
On the whole, then, the research literature suggests that
strategies such as media campaigns whose explicit goal is to affect
individuals' motivations and indirect strategies that change the
incentives associated with out-of-wedlock childbearing both have
the potential to reduce the number of out-of-wedlock births and,
by extension, the number of unintended pregnancies. One can
also make a compelling evidence-based case for programs that
improve individuals' knowledge about how to protect themselves
from unintended pregnancy. Most of the programs falling under
this umbrella are geared towards teens in particular. These pro-
grams-which are typically referred to as "sex education pro-
grams" or "teen pregnancy prevention programs"-are designed
to provide participants with information about the risks of
unprotected sex and about how to avoid becoming pregnant.
Some of these programs encourage sexual abstinence. Others
stress the fact that abstinence is the only sure-fire way of avoiding
pregnancy but also provide information on contraceptive use for
participants who might choose to become or remain sexually
active.
These programs are occasionally confronted with legal chal-
lenges. For example, in Brown v. Hot, Sexy and Safer Productions, a
group of public high school students and their parents brought
action against both the high school and the developer of a sexual
education program that was implemented in that school."
These students and their parents objected to what they consid-
ered to be the excessively lewd and graphic content of the pro-
gram. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, however,
ruled in 1995 that the plaintiffs had "failed to demonstrate an
42. See Benjamin W. Cowan, Fonard-Thinking Teens: The Effects of College
Costs on Adolescent Risky Behavior, 30 EcoN. Enuc. Rtv. 813, 823 (2011).
43. See Barbara Wolfe et al., Do Youth Nonmarital Childbearing Choices Reflect
Income and Relationship Expectations?, 20 J. POPULATION ECON. 73, 86-87.(2007).
44. 68 F.3d 525 (1st Cir. 1995).
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intrusion of constitutional magnitude" on parents' rights to
direct the upbringing of their children.45 More recently, in
Leebaert v. Harrington, the parent of a public school student
objected to the inclusion of a sexual health module in the
school's health and hygiene curriculum even though the school
allowed the student to opt out of the module."6 The parent
claimed that the entire health and hygiene program represented
a violation of his constitutionally protected rights to religious
freedom and family privacy. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit ruled in favor of the school system in 2003, not-
ing that the student was given the right to opt out of the module
and concluding that the parent did not have a basic right to
excuse his son from the overall program." Indeed, in her review
of case law involving challenges to the validity or constitutionality
of sexual education programs, Varley concludes that courts usu-
ally find in favor of the defendant school system by ruling that
schools' authority to determine the content of their curricula
supersedes families' rights to privacy and parental control.48
There is considerable variation in terms of the effectiveness
of sexual education programs. High-quality studies tend to show
that "abstinence-only" programs do not have much of an effect
45. Id. at 533; see, e.g., Religious Liberty: Hearing on Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 106th Cong. 7-14 (1999) (statement of Steven T. McFarland, Chris-
tian Legal Society); Alyssa Varley, Sexuality in Education, 6 GEo. J. GENDER & L.
533, 543 (2005).
46. 332 F.3d 134 (2d Cir. 2003).
47. Id. at 142-43.
48. Varley, supra note 45, at 544. A possible exception to this rule per-
tains to programs that promote an explicitly religious point of view. In ACLUof
Massachusetts v. Sebelius, 697 F. Supp. 2d 200 (D. Mass. 2010), the Massachusetts
chapter of the American Civil Liberties Union brought suit in 2003 against the
department of Health and Human Services (HHS) over its funding of an absti-
nence program called the "Silver Ring Thing." See Complaint, ACLU of Massa-
chusetts v. Sebelius, 697 F. Supp. 2d 200 (D. Mass. 2010); see also Ceci Connolly,
Federal Funds for Abstinence Group Withheld, WASH. PosT, Aug. 23, 2005, at A5.
The lawsuit contended that the federally subsidized program's curriculum was
"permeated with religion." For example, each graduate of the program signed
a pledge "before God almighty" to remain abstinent and received a silver ring
inscribed with a bible passage. Id. Three months after the ACLU brought suit,
HHS ordered the group that developed the program to submit a "corrective
action plan" in order to secure future funding. Id. As part of a settlement with
the ACLU several months later, the federal government then stopped its financ-
ing of the group altogether. See Katie Zezima, Massachusetts: Money for Group is
Cut, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2006, at A9. Although it is impossible to know with
certainty how the court would have ruled on this matter, the fact that the Bush
administration settled out of court suggests that they may have had concerns
about the strength of the ACLU's case.
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on sexual behavior." There is one important exception to this
general rule: a recent high-quality study has shown that a local
intervention implemented in an urban setting in the northeast-
ern United States did in fact have a substantial impact on the
probability of having sex for the first time."' However, this inter-
vention was implemented for girls aged twelve to thirteen. A fair
reading of the research literature thus suggests that, although we
have a bit of evidence that abstinence-only programs may in fact
have an effect on the sexual behavior of pre-teens and young
teens, there is little convincing evidence to suggest that that these
programs have a similar impact among older teens." There is,
however, reliable evidence demonstrating the efficacy of some
"comprehensive" programs-i.e., programs that'stress the bene-
fits of abstinence but also teach proper contraceptive use. Sev-
eral of these programs have been carefully evaluated, and a
subset of these evaluated programs have been found to have had
an effect on sexual frequency and/or contraceptive use. Later in
this Essay, I review new evidence from a series of policy simula-
tions showing that a well-designed national teen pregnancy pre-
vention program could have meaningful impacts on rates of
teenage pregnancy and childbearing.5 2 I developed assumptions
for this simulation by synthesizing the results from evaluations of
several of the most successful comprehensive teen pregnancy
49. In this case, the highest-quality studies have been conducted using
random assignment. In other words, there are a number of studies in which
children at a particular school or in a particular neighborhood were randomly
assigned either to a "treatment group" (i.e., a group of students who were
invited to participate in the program in question) or to a "control group" (i.e.,
students who were not invited to participate in the program). Because the
treatment and control groups in these studies should be comparable save for
the fact that one received the "treatment" and one did not, it is likely that any
differences between them in terms of, say, birth rates are attributable to the
effects of the program being evaluated. See CHRISTOPHER TRENHOLM ET AL.,
IMPACTS OF FOUR TITLE V, SECTION 510 ABSTINENCE EDUCATION PROGRAMS
(2007), for an overview of the estimated effects of several different abstinence-
only programs that were evaluated using random assignment research designs.
50. The program in question was evaluated using random assignment.
See John B. Jemmott III et al., Reductions in HIV Risk-Associated Sexual Behaviors
Among Black Male Adolescents: Effects of an AIDS Prevention Intervention, 82 Am. J.
PUB. HEALTH 372, 374-76 (1992), for a summary of the results of this
evaluation.
51. It should also be noted that this program did not advocate abstinence
until marriage, which is the definition of abstinence-only sexual education laid
out in federal funding guidelines. Nor did the program adopt a moralistic tone
or cast sex in a negative light. For these reasons, the program described here is
dissimilar to the types of programs that receive federal abstinence-only funding.
Id. at 373-74.
52. See infra Part V.
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prevention programs. Based on this synthesis, I conclude that
one might expect a national evidence-based program that draws
on the best practices of proven interventions to increase the
number of teen contraceptive users by 12-13% and to increase
the number of sexually inactive teens by 7-8%.51
Other policies address the third root cause of unintended
pregnancy: limited access to effective contraception. Since the
1970s, family planning services have been provided via state
Medicaid programs and Title X of the Public Health Service Act.
The former are jointly funded by state and federal dollars, and
the latter is funded entirely by the federal government.54 Thirty
years ago, Title X spending substantially outpaced Medicaid fam-
ily planning funding." Since 1980, however, inflation-adjusted
spending on Title X has declined fourfold, and Medicaid family
planning spending has grown even more dramatically. In all,
total inflation-adjusted government spending on family planning
services increased by about 18% from 1980 to the mid-2000s.
Today, more than 70% of the approximately $1.85 billion in gov-
ernment spending on family planning comes from Medicaid;
Title X accounts for about another 12%; and a variety of other
state and federal programs make up the remainder. 6
The most compelling available evidence on the efficacy of
government family planning programs can be found in a second
study by Kearney and Levine. This study estimates the effects of
expansions in states' Medicaid-funded family planning services
that took place between the mid-1990s and the mid-2000s.5 ' Eli-
gibility for these services has historically been limited to women
who are pregnant and to mothers whose incomes place them
below a very low threshold. Since the mid-1990s, however, the
federal government has granted waivers to about half of states
53. In developing these assumptions, I take into account the fact that the
interventions incorporated into my synthesis were implemented on a small
scale but that the simulated program would be implemented on a national
scale. It is likely that "scaling up" these programs would dilute their effective-
ness. I make the (arguably strong) assumption that scaling these programs up
would cut their effectiveness in half. For further information on the way in
which this synthesis was conducted, see Adam Thomas, Estimating the Effects and
Costs of Three Pregnancy-Prevention Programs 3 (Brookings Institution, Working
Paper, Mar. 2011), available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/
papers/2011/03_pregnancy-prevention-thomas/03_pregnancy-prevention
thomas.pdf.
54. See ADAM SONFIELD ET AL., Puni.ic FUNDING FOR FAMILY PLANNING,
STERIIZATION AND AnoRTION SERvIcEs FY 1980-2006, at 5-7 (2008).
55. Id. at 17.
56. Id.
57. See Melissa S. Kearney & Phillip B. Levine, Subsidized Contraception, Fer-
tility, and Sexual Behavior, 91 REV. EcoN. & STAT. 137, 137 (2009).
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allowing them to serve all income-eligible women-regardless of
whether they are pregnant or have children-and, in most cases
allowing states to raise their income-eligibility thresholds as well.
Kearney and Levine compare trends in rates of contraceptive use
and childbearing in states that expanded their Medicaid pro-
grams to comparable changes in states that did not implement
such expansions." The authors assume that the difference in
these trends is attributable to the state Medicaid expansions, and
they conclude that these expansions produced a reduction of
about 5% in the number of sexually active adult women who fail
to use contraception at a given act of intercourse.5 ' They also
conclude that the expansions produced reductions of about 4%
in the number of births to teens and about 2% in the number of
births to non-teens.co
V. EVIDENCE-BASED POLICIES ARE COST-EFFECTIVE
In sum, there are a variety of public policies that have
demonstrated potential for addressing the three root causes of
unintended pregnancy. The reader may be wondering, however,
whether the effects described here are "big" or "small." Is it
worth investing in policies that only reduce birth rates by 4% or
that increase condom use by a mere 6%? In fact, most of us who
study public policy would conclude that a 5% change in a key
outcome is, in the grand scheme of things, a rather large impact.
It is an unfortunate fact that policymakers rarely hit upon a "sil-
ver bullet" solution that single-handedly produces a dramatic
change in rates of poverty, unemployment, unintended preg-
nancy, or any other needle that one might hope to move. This
reality should not be all that surprising. After all, a phenomenon
like unintended pregnancy is enormously complex, and it is
surely affected by innumerable factors that are immune to policy
manipulation. There is a limit to the amount that government
can do, for example, to affect individuals' decisions about
whether to use contraception in the heat of the moment when
such decisions are often made.
This consideration has two implications. First, policies
should be evaluated not only in terms of their impacts on key
outcomes such as (in this case) rates of unintended pregnancy
and out-of-wedlock childbearing, but also in terms of whether
they provide a good return on investment. We may be inter-
ested, for example, in determining whether the taxpayer savings
58. Id. at 143.
59. Id. at 148.
60. Id. at 137.
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produced by the policies described here exceed the amount
required to fund them. Policies that pay for themselves might be
considered to be good investments. And second, we would prob-
ably be wise not to put all of our eggs into a single basket. In
other words, policymakers should consider funding a portfolio of
pregnancy prevention programs that have been shown to be cost-
effective. In a newly published paper, I report results from a
series of detailed policy simulations in which I model the pro-
jected effects of three evidence-based pregnancy prevention pro-
grams: a national mass media campaign encouraging condom
use, a national teen pregnancy prevention program targeted on
at-risk adolescents, and expansions in Medicaid family planning
programs within the roughly half of states that did not imple-
ment such expansions over the last fifteen or so years.' In the
previous section, I reviewed the best available evidence on the
effects of each of these programs. I incorporated that evidence
into a sophisticated simulation model of family formation that
was developed at the Brookings Institution. I summarize the
results of these simulations here."
Each policy was simulated under a variety of different under-
lying assumptions. In the discussion here, I focus on the results
for my preferred versions of each simulation-i.e., the versions
of each simulation that rely on assumptions that I believe to be
the most sensible and realistic. The results of these simulations
suggest that the mass media campaign would reduce the number
of unintended pregnancies by 3.6% and would reduce the num-
ber of children born into poverty by 2.2%; that the teen preg-
nancy program would reduce the number of teen pregnancies by
7.5% and would reduce the number of children born into pov-
erty by 1.4%; and that the Medicaid family planning expansion
would reduce the number of unintended pregnancies by 4.1%
and would reduce the number of children born into poverty by
1.8%. These estimates correspond with reductions of 23,000,
15,000, and 19,000 in the number of children born into poverty
under the media campaign, the teen pregnancy program, and
the Medicaid expansion, respectively.
61. Thomas, supra note 38.
62. For a detailed discussion of the structure of the simulation model, see
Adam Thomas & Emily Monea, FamilyScape: A Simulation Model of Family Forma-
tion (Brookings Institution, Working Paper, May 2009), available at http://www.
brookings.edu/-/media/Files/rc/papers/2009/05_familyscape-thomas-
monea/05_familyscape-thomas monea.pdf. For more information on the way
in which the policy simulations were conducted, see Thomas, supra note 53;
Thomas, supra note 38.
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Are these policies cost-effective? Appendix B" shows esti-
mated benefit-cost ratios for each policy. I calculate the policies'
benefits by estimating the amount of taxpayer savings to means-
tested government programs that would be generated by the
reductions in unintended pregnancy produced by the simulated
programs. It is important to note that my calculations allow for
the possibility-indeed, the likelihood-that many pregnancies,
if they are prevented today, will simply occur at a later point in
time. Thus, the normative implication of these results is decid-
edly not that the births prevented by these policies ought never to
occur. Rather, the point is that children, their parents, and soci-
ety at large will be better off if potential parents wait to have chil-
dren until they are truly prepared to assume the responsibilities
of parenthood. Returning to Appendix B, I estimate that the
media campaign, the teen pregnancy prevention program and
the Medicaid expansion would save taxpayers $4.31, $2.46, and
$5.62, respectively, for each dollar that is spent on them.
It is also important to note that these estimates sometimes
change when I alter the assumptions underlying the policy simu-
lations. Most importantly, the benefit-cost ratios shown in
Appendix B are calculated based on a measure of public savings
that accounts for taxpayer expenditures on means-tested benefits
for children up to the age of five. If instead I use a savings mea-
sure that only accounts for taxpayer savings on benefits provided
to children under one year of age, only the Medicaid expansion
has a benefit-cost ratio that is greater than one. However, I
believe that a longer time horizon provides a more complete pic-
ture of the amount of savings that the simulated policies would
actually generate. Moreover, most of the key assumptions under-
lying these simulations were quite conservative. Taken as a
whole, these assumptions make it likely that my results understate
the true return on investment that would be produced by the
simulated policies. Even under this relatively stringent set of
assumptions, my results suggest that these policies offer two
important benefits. First, they would improve the lives of chil-
dren and families by reducing unintended pregnancy, teen
births, and child poverty. And second, they would produce sav-
ings to taxpayers that substantially exceed the amount required
to fund them. In short, these policies are a win-win from the
standpoint of children, their families, and society at large.
63. See infra page 531.
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VI. THE POLITICS OF UNINTENDED PREGNANCY
Policies designed to curb unintended pregnancy are often
politically controversial. Medicaid family planning funding has
been a particularly prominent bone of political contention in
recent years. An early version of the economic stimulus bill
passed soon after President Obama's inauguration contained a
provision that would have expanded Medicaid family planning
subsidies, but the provision was met with fierce opposition from
pro-life Republicans who argued (somewhat reasonably) that
family planning policies did not belong in a bill whose focus was
on creating jobs and spurring economic growth. Democrats
countered (correctly) that the provision would generate public
sector savings over the long run. At the President's urging, Dem-
ocratic leaders stripped the family planning provision from the
bill before it was debated on the House floor. 4 Of particular
concern to the pro-life community is the fact that Planned
Parenthood is a prominent recipient of Medicaid family plan-
ning dollars. However, the so-called Hyde amendment prohibits
federal funding of abortion under most circumstances, and the
approximately $320 million that Planned Parenthood receives
annually from the federal government is spent on other activi-
ties-most notably, its contraceptive services. Detractors argue
that this funding allows Planned Parenthood to reallocate some
of the money it would otherwise have spent on contraceptive ser-
vices to abortion-related services. Thus, the argument goes,
Planned Parenthood's government subsidies effectively increase
the number of federally subsidized abortions even if those subsi-
dies are not directly used to pay for abortions."
It is entirely possible that this argument is, on the margins,
at least somewhat correct. In other words, the type of budgetary
reallocation described above may sometimes occur on a small
scale. What this line of argument ignores, however, is the critical
fact that subsidizing contraception reduces the number of unin-
tended pregnancies and therefore the demand for abortion. For
example, I estimate that the reduction in unintended pregnancy
64. See, e.g., Adam Thomas & Isabel V. Sawhill, Keep Politics Away from the
Promise of Family Planning, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION Bi.oG (Feb. 05, 2009),
http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2009/0205_family-planning-thomas
sawhill.aspx; Steven Thomma, Obama Urges Dems to Dump Family Planning from
Stimulus, McCLATCHY NEWSPAPERS (Jan. 27, 2009), http://www.mcclatchydc.
com/2009/01/27/60820/obama-urges-dems-to-dump-family.html.
65. See, e.g., Adam Thomas & Isabel V. Sawhill, Family Planning Subsidies:
Much Ado About Something, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION Ui FRONT BLOG (Apr.
12, 2011), http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2011/0412_amily-planning-
thomassawhill.aspx.
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produced by the simulated expansion in Medicaid family plan-
ning services described in the previous section would lead to
40,000 fewer abortions annually." In order for federal family
planning subsidies to produce a net increase in the number of
abortions, they would therefore have to engender an enormous
amount of budgetary reallocation on the part of providers such
as Planned Parenthood. There is no evidence that reallocation
occurs on such a scale. Thus, it is much more likely that family
planning subsidies lead to a net decrease in abortion than to a
net increase.
This consideration has not deterred some members of Con-
gress from continuing to target family planning funding. During
negotiations over the debt ceiling in the spring of 2011, congres-
sional Republicans attempted unsuccessfully to strip Planned
Parenthood of its federal funding." Indeed, Senate Majority
Leader Harry Reid (D-NV) stated that Republicans were holding
up the entire negotiation process and risking a shutdown of the
federal government over family planning funds." More recently,
House Republicans' initial draft of the fiscal year 2012 Labor,
Health and Human Services, and Education appropriations bill
proposed to cut spending for pregnancy prevention programs by
2.5% relative to last year's level of funding and by 15% relative to
the president's funding request.70 Among the most crucial
aspects of these proposed cuts were reductions in spending on
family planning services provided by Title X and Medicaid. The
proposed legislation would also have cut millions of dollars in
federal funding for evidence-based teen pregnancy prevention
programs. The final version of the bill-produced after exten-
66. Id.
67. Id. See also Kearney & Levine, supra note 57, for a study that finds
that previous expansions in Medicaid family planning subsidies reduced the
incidence of abortion. This estimated effect is net of any budgetary reallocation
that family planning providers might have implemented.
68. See, e.g., Jennifer Steinhauer, No Halt to Planned Parenthood Fight, CAU-
cus: THE POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT BLOG OF THE N.Y. TIMEs (Apr. 12,
2011, 6:02 PM), http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/04/12/no-halt-to-
plan ned-parenthood-fight/.
69. See, e.g., Jed Lewison, Reid Says GOP Threatening Shutdown Over Family
Planning, Boehner Avoids Talking Specifics, DAILY Kos (Apr. 08, 2011, 8:32 AM),
http://www.dailykos.com/story/2011/04/08/964783/-Reid-says-GOP-
threatening-shutdown-over-family-planning-funding,-Boehner-avoids-talking-
specifics.
70. Press Release, Nat'l Campaign to Prevent Teen and Unplanned Preg-
nancy, House Appropriations Plan Would Severely Cut or Eliminate Funding
for Programs to Prevent Teen and Unplanned Pregnancy (Oct. 4, 2011), availa-
ble at http://www.thenationalcampaign.org/policymakers/PDF/Statement
HouseAppropsBill2012.pdf.
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sive negotiations between House and Senate lawmakers-
restored most (but not all) of the funding that the initial draft of
the House bill proposed to cut.'
The Obama administration, on the other hand, has been a
vigorous proponent of evidence-based pregnancy prevention
programs. For example, the health care reform legislation
passed in 2010, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
("ACA"), provides most states with the option of expanding eligi-
bility for Medicaid family planning services without having to
navigate the cumbersome federal waivers process. This expan-
sion has the potential to affect states that do not have family plan-
ning waivers and a subset of waiver states that could implement
further increases in their programs under the new state option.
These individual states must now decide whether to take advan-
tage of the option available to them. A separate provision in the
ACA also allocates $75 million in annual funding for evidence-
based interventions to reduce teen pregnancy. These resources
complement an additional $110 million in discretionary funding
for competitive grants to support both the replication of teen
pregnancy prevention programs that have been shown to be
effective and the implementation and evaluation of new interven-
tions that have yet to be studied carefully." Also important is the
fact that, during the summer of 2011, the administration issued a
new regulation requiring health insurers to cover expenses
related to contraception without cost sharing (i.e., without charg-
ing a co-pay) .7 Past experience suggests that this regulation-
notwithstanding the controversy that ensued in the wake of its
announcement-will likely increase contraceptive use and, as a
result, reduce unintended pregnancy.
Overall, then, the Obama administration has implemented
new regulations and increased funding for programs that,
according to the research reviewed in this Essay, are likely to
reduce abortion and child poverty, improve the lives of children
and families, curb rates of unintended pregnancy and out-of-wed-
lock childbearing, and save taxpayers millions of dollars.
71. Press Release, Nat'l Campaign to Prevent Teen and Unplanned Preg-
nancy, Congress Passes FY 2012 Appropriations Bill (Dec. 20, 2011), available at
http://www.thenationalcampaign.org/policymakers/PDF/Appropriations
StatementFY12.pdf.
72. See Adam Thomas, Ctr. on Children & Families, Policy Solutions for
Preventing Unplanned Pregnancy, BROOKINGs 7 (2012), http://www.brookings.
edu/reports/2012/03_.unplanned-pregnancy-thomas.aspx.
73. See Adam Sonfield, New Federal Protections Expand Coverage Without Cost-
Sharing of Contraceptives and Other Women's Preventive Services, 14 GUTiEMACHER
Pot'Y REv. 24 (Summer 2011).
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Although congressional Republicans have a track record of
opposing these measures, the evidence suggests reasonably defin-
itively that the administration is on the right track.
Progress has been somewhat mixed at the state level. For
example, five states have neglected to claim the State Personal
Responsibility Education Program ("PREP") grants that were
made available to them by the ACA." PREP grants are provided
to states to subsidize implementation of teen pregnancy preven-
tion programs that educate adolescents both on the merits of
abstinence and on how to use contraception. States are required
to incorporate into their PREP programs elements of other inter-
ventions that have been proven to be effective." To be clear,
these resources are "free" to states, which is to say that the states
in question do not need to spend any of their own money to
access their PREP funds. These resources have the potential to
prevent thousands of teen pregnancies in the states in question.
Public officials in those states would be wise to claim their share
of PREP funds and use them to implement carefully structured,
76evidence-based programs.
Another potential cause for concern is the fact that a large
number of states have yet to avail themselves of the new option
provided by the ACA to expand their family planning services
under Medicaid. Since the passage of the ACA, seven states have
taken advantage of this option, and another twenty-two states
have expanded access to Medicaid-subsidized contraception
using waivers that were granted prior to passage of the legislation
but are still in operation.7 7 Thus, there are twenty-one states that
have not expanded their family planning services despite the fact
that they have the option to do so under the health care law.7
In fact, a handful of states are actively seeking to eliminate part or
74. See Personal Responsibility Education Program, NAT'L CAMPAIGN TO PRE-
VENT TEEN & UNPLANNED PREGNANCY, http://www.thenationalcampaign.org/
federalfunding/prep.aspx (last visited Feb. 24, 2012).
75. Id.
76. The five states that have not yet claimed their PREP funds are Florida,
Indiana, North Dakota, Texas, and Virginia, based on the author's analysis of
data reported in the United States Department of Health and Human Services,
Administration for Children and Families, FY 2011 Teen Pregnancy Prevention
Grant Awards, available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/fysb/content/
docs/ 1 1-tpp.htm#stateprep.
77. The seven states that have availed themselves of the new state option
are California, New Mexico, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Virginia, and
Wisconsin. See State Policies in Brief Medicaid Family Planning Eligibility Expan-
sions, GurrMACHER INST. 1, 2 (2012), http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/
spibs/spibSMFPE.pdf.
78. Id.
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all of their funding for family planning services, and some of
these efforts have already succeeded. For example, the Texas
legislature has cut the state's family planning budget by nearly
two-thirds." These cuts were implemented despite the fact that
an analysis from the legislature's own budget office showed that
they would ultimately lead to an increase in the state's Medicaid
budget of more than $200 million."o The projected increase in
Medicaid spending is more than triple the amount that the state
is saving on the family planning cuts. Governor Chris Christie
(R) has also recently eliminated all state family planning funding
in New Jersey.a" And in Indiana, Governor Mitch Daniels (R)
signed a bill into law that eliminated funding for organizations
(such as Planned Parenthood) that provide both family planning
services and abortions. In June of 2011, however, a U.S. district
judge granted a temporary injunction against the Indiana law's
enforcement, effectively reinstating Planned Parenthood's fund-
ing for the time being. The judge ruled that the state law vio-
lated Medicaid patients' freedom to use the health care provider
of their choice. 2 The matter is now before a federal appeals
court." A similar injunction is presently in place in Kansas,
where Governor Sam Brownback (R) signed into law a bill strip-
ping Planned Parenthood of family planning funds.8 4 As in Indi-
ana, this issue is still being adjudicated in Kansas.8
79. See Thanh Tan et al., Planned Parenthood Struggles After State Budget
Cuts, TEX. TRIB., Oct. 16, 2011, available at http://www.texastribune.org/
library/multimedia/planned-parenthood-budget-cuts/.
80. Memorandum from the Legislative Budget Bd. to the Office of State
Representative Dawnna Dukes, Analysis of Family Planning Reductions at the
Department of State Health Services (May 5, 2011), available at http://www.
texasobserver.org/media/k2/attachments/FamilyPlanning.pdf.
81. See Esm6 E. Deprez, Family Planning Loses Out in the Budget Brawl:
Republican-Controlled States are Cutting Funding for Clinics, BLOOMBERG BUSINESS-
WEEK (May 19, 2011, 5:00 PM), www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/
1122/b4230031808514.htm.
82. See Charles Wilson & Deanna Martin, Planned Parenthood Win in Indi-
ana: Judge Blocks Parts of Tough New Abortion Law, HUFFINGTON PosT (June 25,
2011, 12:42 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/06/24/planned-
parenthood-indiana n_884418.htmi.
83. See Scott Sarvay, Indiana's De-funding ofPlanned Parenthood Heads to Fed-
eral Appeals Court, INDIANA'S NEWSCENTER (Oct. 20, 2011, 4:38 PM), http://www.
indianasnewscenter.com/news/political-radar/Indianas-Defunding-of-Planned-
Parenthood-Heads-to-Federal-Appeals-Court-132270588.html.
84. See Mary Wisniewski, judge Blocks Kansas Law Aimed at Planned
Parenthood, REUTERS UK (Aug. 2, 2011, 5:24 AM), http://uk.reuters.com/
article/2011/ 08/02/health-us-abortion-states-kansas-idUKTRE7704FQ201
10802.
85. Family planning funding has also recently been cut in Florida, New
Hampshire, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Wisconsin. See State by State
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Given that many states are grappling with budget shortfalls,
governors and legislatures may feel inclined to reduce expendi-
tures on family planning programs rather than expand them.
But the research reviewed here suggests that this is precisely the
right time for strapped states to implement expansions in their
Medicaid family planning services, since doing so would likely
generate fiscal savings. As a group, then, federal and state policy-
makers deserve a mixed report card. The Obama administra-
tion, the president's allies in Congress, and many governors and
state legislators deserve credit for steering resources to proven
pregnancy prevention strategies that are likely to improve the
well-being of their citizenry and save their taxpayers money.
However, this progress is now threatened by efforts to reduce or
even eliminate key sources of family planning funding at the
state and federal levels and by the reluctance of some state gov-
ernments to accept federal funding for evidence-based preg-
nancy prevention programs. The evidence reviewed in this Essay
suggests that investments in proven pregnancy prevention strate-
gies ought to be appealing to policymakers in both parties and at
all levels of government, whether their primary goal is to reduce
the incidence of abortion, improve child well-being, curb rates of
non-marital and teen childbearing, or reduce government
spending.
VII. CONCLUSION
Unintended pregnancy has become a prominent feature of
the American social landscape. This fact has important implica-
tions for children, for families, and for society at large: unin-
tended pregnancy is associated with outcomes ranging from high
school dropout and child poverty to juvenile delinquency and
abortion. Reductions in the rate of unintended pregnancies
have the potential to generate meaningful improvements along
each of these dimensions. In this Essay, I have shown that unin-
tended pregnancy rates declined substantially in recent years for
teens but increased modestly over the same period for young
adults. The central question, then, is what can be done to main-
tain the progress we have seen among teens and to reverse the
trends observed among older women.
Fortunately, there is an extensive academic literature both
on the causes of unintended pregnancy and on the likely effects
of policy prescriptions aimed at reducing its incidence. With
respect to the first of these two considerations, there is evidence
Scoreboard, SUSAN B. ANTHONY LisT, http://www.sba-list.org/PPScoreboard (last
visited Feb. 24, 2012).
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to suggest: (1) that many individuals lack the motivation to avoid
unintended pregnancy; (2) that others have the best of inten-
tions but little understanding of how to follow through on those
intentions; and (3) that still others are armed with the right
information and the motivation to put it to good use but have
limited access to the most effective forms of contraception.
There is also convincing evidence from high-quality studies show-
ing that public policy can affect each of these root causes via
interventions such as media campaigns discouraging unsafe sex,
comprehensive teen pregnancy prevention programs, and expan-
sions in government subsidies for contraceptive services. Many
policymakers have made wise investments in such programs.
However, other officials have declined federal funding for
proven pregnancy prevention strategies or have even sought to
reduce or eliminate existing sources of funding for these
programs.
The politicization of this set of issues is unfortunate. Reduc-
tions in unintended pregnancy produce a variety of benefits-
improved life prospects for women and children, lower rates of
abortion and single parenthood, and reduced government
spending-that should be appealing to partisans on both sides of
the aisle. At the same time, pregnancy prevention policies ought
not to be viewed as cure-alls. Many of the factors that contribute
to unintended pregnancy are not directly susceptible to policy
manipulation. For instance, while strategies such as media cam-
paigns and sex education interventions may induce some individ-
uals to engage in safer sexual behavior, there are many young
men and women living at the margins of society who anticipate
few, if any, meaningful returns to turning over a new leaf. As
such, policies that improve public education, reduce economic
inequality, and reward those who "play by the rules" are also
likely to be critical pieces of this puzzle. Moving forward, it will
be important that the public officials tasked with addressing our
high rate of unintended pregnancy be clear-headed in their
assessment of the relevant evidence, broad-minded in their devel-
opment of policy solutions, and resolute in the face of political
opposition. Unintended pregnancy has become a genuinely
pressing problem in the United States, and a serious and sus-
tained commitment on the part of our policymakers is required
if further progress is to be made.
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APPENDIX A: TRENDS IN UNINTENDED PREGNANCY &
PREGNANCY OUTCOMES, BY AGE86
FIGURE 1: TRENDS IN UNINTENDED PREGNANCY, UNINTENDED
CHILDBEARING, AND ABORTION AMONG WOMEN AGED 15-44
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86. Figures 1-3 based on the author's compilation and analysis of data
reported in Finer & Zolna, supra note 1, Finer & Henshaw, supra note 18, Hen-
shaw, supra note 18, Jones & Kooistra, supra note 18, and Kost et al., supra note
18.
20
UNINTENDED PREGNANCY AND PUBLIC POLICY
FiGuRE 2: TRENDS IN UNINTENDED PREGNANCY, UNINTENDED
CHILDBEARING, AND ABORTION AMONG WOMEN AGED 15-19
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FIGURE 3: TRENDS IN UNINTENDED PREGNANCY, UNINTENDED
CHILDBEARING, AND ABORTION AMONG WOMEN AGED 20-29
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APPENDIX B: BENEFIT-COST RATIOS FOR THREE
EVIDENCE-BASED PREGNANCY PREVENTION POLICIES8 7
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87. Based on an analysis of programs studied in Thomas, supra note 53,
showing estimated taxpayer savings for every dollar spent on the three preg-
nancy prevention programs discussed in supra, Part V.
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